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Public Utility Debt Ratios and the Public
Interest-Reasonable Fixed Charges
and Just and Reasonable Rates
Melvin G. Dakin*
Mr, Dakin explores the complex and difficult field of the financing of
public utilities corporations. He describes and evaluates the approaches
of four commissions: the Securities and Exchange Commission which
must approve the reorganization of public utilities corporations which
have gone into bankruptcy, the Federal Communications Commission,
the Federal Power Commission, and the Michigan Public Service Com-
mission. He concludes by suggesting that in some instances these
agencies are placing too great emphasis on their conception of sound
financing at the expense of the customers served by these utilities.
I.
The decade of the 1930's witnessed a tremendous expansion in the scope
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, likened by some to the addition of a new and
modem wing to an essentially nineteenth century structure. High on the
agenda of the first Roosevelt administration was the reform of corporate
reorganization practices so as to afford more adequate protection to in-
vestors against the free wheeling securities transactions of earlier years. In
March 1933 Congress enacted the first version of section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, providing for the reorganization of railroads under court and
Interstate Commerce Commission auspices.1 In June 1934 it followed with
section 77B providing for general corporate reorganization under the
aegis of the bankruptcy courts; provisions were made, however, for refer-
ring plans involving reorganization of public utilities to appropriate state
or federal commissions for approval.2 In August 1935 Congress enacted
a completely rewritten section 77 for railroad reorganizations3 and a
statute providing, a pervasive scheme of regulation for the public utility
industry in its interstate aspects; the latter was known as the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935. It provided that, in order to be effective,
court proceedings in bankruptcy and reorganization involving public
utility holding companies or their subsidiaries had to be submitted to the
C Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933).
2. Ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 912 (1934).
3. 49 Stat. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1958).
4. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1958).
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Securities and Exchange Commission for approval.5 In addition the act
contained provisions for reorganization under direct Commission supervi-
sion with court enforcement where necessary.
6
It was of the essence that submitted plans of reorganization be "fair
and equitable" to assure that old security holders received their full and
fair entitlement for securities relinquished. It was also important, in order
to assure a "reasonable prospect of survival" to the reorganized companies,
that new securities issued be reasonably adapted to earning power and
capital structures. The Public Utility Holding Company Act specifically so
provided and included an important omnibus provision that the "terms and
conditions of the issue or sale of the security" not be "detrimental to the
public interest or the interest of investors or consumers."7 The rewritten
section 77, mentioned above, was even more explicit with respect to rail-
road reorganizations:
[A reorganization plan] shall provide for filxed charges (including fixed interest on
funded debt, interest on unfunded debt, amortization of discount on funded debt,
and rent for leased railroads) in such an amount that, after due consideration of
the probable prospective earnings of the property in light of its earnings experi-
ence and all other relevant facts, there shall be adequate coverage of such fixed
charges by the probable earnings available for the payment thereof.8
Such preoccupation with sound security issuance was a natural after-
math of the excesses brought to light in the investigations undertaken in
the early 1930's. The frenzied contests between holding companies, for
utility properties resulted in burdening the utility industry with a super-
structure of holding company securities so fantastically overextended that
collapse was inevitable. Acquisitions of properties were common at two,
three, or more times their book value; in order to obtain properties, interest
and dividend obligations were undertaken which were out of all proportion
to the earning power of the properties. In much of this activity investment
bankers played an important role. "In the heydey of holding-company
exploitation just prior to the depression, investment bankers not only fur-
nished financial aid when requested by holding companies, but solicited
it and came to depend upon holding companies for business."9
Often essential to the success of the holding company empire was the
"pyramiding" device; this contrivance, by means of the issuance of senior
securities at several levels, assured the top holding companies of control
of a maximum of operating properties with minimum investment. 10 Thus,
starting with an operating property capitalized with 50% debt, 25% preferred
5. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(f) (1958).
6. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(e) (1958).
7. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(g)(d)(5) (1958).
8. 49 Stat. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (4) (1958).
9. S. REP'. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-57 (1935).
10. S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 72A, at 156 (1935).
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stock, and 25% common stock, there could be superimposed thereon a com-
pany holding the common stock; this latter company could in turn be
capitalized with 50% preferred stock, or even some debt, and 50% common
stock. This might be repeated two, three, or even four times; each repeti-
tion would preserve control through ownership of the common stock of
the company below, but the investment burden would be shared with the
senior security holders at a fixed return. Thus an investment of $15,000 at
the top might control operating property worth $1,000,000. Assuming a
12% return on the common stock of the operating company, the return
on the investment in the common stock of the top holding company might
be several times that." Of course, if the investments in operating company
securities were made at excessive prices, the fixed charges for interest
and prior claims of preferred dividends might absorb the earnings of the
operating company to the point where nothing was left for the upper
reaches of the holding company structure. One of the more spectacular
failures due to just such a practice is seen in the Associated Gas & Electric
System, erected by H. C. Hopson and Associates. An investment of
$300,000 at the top of the structure controlled a utility system having book
assets in excess of $1,000,000,000; when the earning power of the operating
properties was unable to support the holding company securities which
had been issued in the process of pyramiding, the structure collapsed.' 2
An almost inevitable accompaniment of excessive security issuance was
the "write-up" of operating assets or portfolio securities to provide "balance
sheet" support for such securities. Studies made by the Federal Trade
Commission indicate that "write-ups" and improperly capitalized intangibles
comprised $864,000,000 of the capital assets of $3,306,000,000 held by 91
privately owned operating companies in 1928. Additional write-ups were
contained in the accounts of the holding companies erected on top of the
operating companies. 13
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 the Securities
and Exchange Commission set about the task of rationalizing the tangled
mass of holding companies by outright elimination of some unnecessary
companies and by limiting control, in the main, to one integrated public
utility system "not so large (considering the state of the art and the area
or region affected) as to impair the advantages of localized management,
efficient operation, or the effectiveness of regulation." 4 At the Commis-
sion's disposal was probably the most pervasive regulatory statute which
Congress had ever enacted. Even as to subsidiary operating companies, its
11. Id. at 157-58.
12. Id. at 356. For approval of a reorganization plan by the Securities and Exchange
Commission see Stanley Clarke, 15 S.E.C. 743 (1944).
13. S. Doc. No. 92, supra note 10, at 298-302. BARuNs, Tm EcoNoMucs OF PUBLIC
UTnxry R EULATom 95 (1947).
14. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1)(C) (1958).
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powers over the issuance of new securities were dominant.15 These powers,
coupled with the power to remedy unfair and inequitable distributions
of voting power, enabled the Commission to compel reorganization of
security structures and the elimination of write-ups.' 6 In discharging its
duties under the act, the Commission was undoubtedly guided by the %vise
counsel of the National Power Policy Committee. In recommending legis-
lation to Congress and the President, that Committee had said:
The ultimate purpose of the legislation should be the practical elimination within
a reasonable time of the holding company where it serves no demonstrably
useful and necessary purpose. But the amount of reorganization, transfers of
assets, and distributions in dissolution required for the dismantling of our huge
holding-company systems is so great that the task of elimination cannot be accom-
plished in a year or two without possibly too great a sacrifice of apparent values.
Furthermore, it seems adminstratively advisable that every opportunity be offered
the owners of holding-company securities to work out their own processes of
dismantling. That opportunity should, of course, be vigilantly guarded to protect
the average investor from the exploitation threatening him almost as a matter of
course under our usual methods and mores of corporate reorganization. In de-
stroying the abuses of the holding companies, the Government must not leave
great groups of helpless investors to the certain abuses of extensive hurried cor-
porate reorganizations. The dominant groups who have ruthlessly plucked the
investor in promoting some of these huge holding companies must not be allowed
to pluck him again as reorganization managers.
17
In the main, due to the pervasive statutory powers granted by Congress,
the Commission's work could be accomplished by voluntary reorganizations
under the Holding Company Act itself; reorganization or liquidation under
the Bankruptcy Act was the exception rather than the rule. Nonetheless,
the standards applied in the fixing of debt ratios and in the determination
of appropriate over-all capital structures were necessarily those which
Congress had spelled out in amending section 77 in 1935.18 As to new
financing, the Holding Company Act was clear in requiring that securities
issued be either common stock or'bonds secured by a first mortgage or
collateral.19 -
As to refunding issues or exchanges, however, the Commission was given
discretion to continue old capital structures in effect; here the Commission
could find the standards of the act to be met, where earnings warranted
the finding, even though the refunding debt securities were debentures
rather than first liens in security and even though they aggregated as much
as 60%,of capitalization, or, with preferred stock, as much as 70 to 75% of
15. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(g) (1958).
16. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79k(b) (2), 79(f) (1958).
17. S. REP. No. 621, op. cit. supra note 9, at 58. See 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79(a) (1958).
18. 'See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
19. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), ,15 U.S.C. § 79g(c) (1) (1958).
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capitalization. 20 Earnings coverage of two to three times interest on debt
was, of course, possible even though the ratio of debt was 60% of capitaliza-
tion, given favorable interest rates and a liberal rate of earnings. Approval
of such transactions, however, made possible perpetuation of control with
a disproportionately low common stock investment. Forces within the
Commission were soon vigorously pressing the argument that bonds must
be kept in a reasonable relationship to net property and capitalization,
whether part of new financing or merely refundings. In 1941 the Commis-
sion announced that thereafter its policy as to both new and refunding
issues would be the same.2 1 The Commission did not announce any
specific debt ratio or ratios which it regarded as appropriate at this time,
but it did quote various authorities, at least one of whom suggested "that
a debt structure equal to 50 per cent of the original cost value would be
high enough. . . . [P]referably, I would rather see a debt structure not
exceeding 35 to 40 per cent of original cost values." A minimum percentage
of capitalization for the common equity was thought to be 25%; "debt plus
preferred should not exceed 75 per cent of present book value." z2
The Commission relied heavily upon railroad financial history in its
arguments for lowering the debt ratios of the public utility companies. Thus
the Commission stated:
Perpetuation of a high debt structure through refundings may . . . be a policy
which is unsafe except for a short run. For in times of trouble, earnings fall
off and continued depression may bring about such a weight of fixed charges
on excessive debt that bankruptcy ensues. Or bankruptcy may ensue from default
on debt at maturity when further refunding is impossible because of adverse
market, industrial or general economic conditions. If bankruptcy comes, the fair-
ness of a reorganization plan must be tested by the doctrine of "full or absolute
priority" as reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co. [308 U.S. 106 (1939).] In many instances, this
means that the common stockholders may be denied participation in the reorganized
company because of the absence of sufficient value to cover the senior interests in
the bankrupt company. Refundings, despite their immediate benefits, may thus
forebode a dire future, in the long run, for the common stockholders, although
it may benefit them in the short run.23
The debt ratio problems of the Commission may be illustrated by a
rather typical refunding and accounting reorganization in the Electric
Bond and Share Company. Bond and Share had gone into Florida in the
middle 1920's and had begun the assembling of what is now Florida Power
&-Light Company. Properties with an original cost of some $25,000,000
were acquired for approximately $30,000,000. These properties, plus a
20. Public Serv. Co., 5 S.E.C. 788, 818-22 (1939).
21. El Paso Elec. Co., 8 S.E.C. 366, 383-93, 37 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65, 80 (1940).
22. 21 SAviNGs BANK J. 34 (May, 1940), quoted in 8 S.E.C. at. 383 n.1, 37
P.U.R. (n.s.) at80 n.1.
23. 8 S.E.C. at 390-91, 37 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 87.
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commitment to furnish some $12,000,000 in cash, were transferred to the
new Florida Company in exchange for $30,000,000 principal amount of
bonds, $12,841,000 of preferred stock and $30,000,000 stated value of
common stock. Property account was charged with some $3,675,000 of
bond discount on the $30,000,000 of bonds and with some $28,200,000 of
"write-up" to balance otherwise unsupported common stock stated value.24
In 1941 the Commission instituted proceedings against Florida Company,
seeking the elimination of write-ups, an increase in the reserve for deprecia-
tion, the subordination of certain debentures held by the parent, American,
and the making of other corporate adjustments. Florida Company coun-
tered by filing an application to refund its bonds and call preferred stock
without disturbing the write-ups in plant account nor making provision
for amortizing* certain acquisition adjustments. 25 Such refunding of bonds
and calling of preferred stock would have had the unquestioned effect of
markedly improving earnings coverage; it would have perpetuated, how-
ever, an excessive debt ratio and a disproportionately small common stock
investment when write-ups in plant account were taken into account. The
ultimate compromise reached in this proceeding illustrates the difficulties
facing the Commission in attaining its multiple objectives of a sound
security structure in reasonable relationship to net property and with
fixed charges reasonably related to earning power. Florida Company and
its corporate parent American finally agreed to eliminate some $28,000,000
of write-up from plant account and to increase common stock investment
by subordinating parent-held senior securities. But the Commission had
to settle for a decrease in the debt ratio to capitalization from 77.3% to a
still excessive 73.3%; in terms of debt ratio to net plant, the decrease was
from 83.5% to 75.4%.2 6 Furthermore, the debt was of such proportions that
a substantial part of it had to be in debentures and serial notes rather than
the first mortgage bonds which the act required for new financing. One of
the hard and practical facts which the Florida Company refunding illus-
trated was that the elimination of debt from the security structure was
immediately reflected in higher income taxes, since interest expense was a
deduction while earnings accruing to the common stock were simply income
subject to full corporate income taxes. Thus, in the Florida Company case,
because 5 and 6% bonds and $6 and $7 preferred stock were being elimi-
nated, the earnings for the common increased almost $2,000,000. But in-
come taxes increased almost $1,000,000 in the process. 27 These taxes had
to be collected, of course, from Florida Company consumers. Yet in the
1941 statement of principles governing new and refunding issues the Com-
mission had said:
24. Florida Power & Light Co., 15 S.E.C. 85, 89-91 (1943).
25. Id. at 87.




Replacing some of the existing debt by the sale of common stock may be at an
apparent "cost" of 9 or 10 per cent yet actually it may cost the issuer's [present]
stockholders nothing, and, moreover, may add a substantial margin of safety to
the remaining senior securities. On the other hand, a-mere reduction in interest
rates may be only an apparent benefit, creating the illusion that the capital structure
is being strengthened because of an increase in earnings coverage, but in reality
perpetuating a top-heavy debt structure that subjects the company to the risk of
default and the common stock to the risk of being completely wiped out.A
In its 1935 report and recommendation for holding company legislation,
the National Power Policy Committee had stated that "as in almost every
phase of the holding-company problem the ultimate interests of consumers
and investors are identical" and had concluded that "in a system burdened
with overcapitalized and debt-ridden holding companies, the consumers
of operating subsidiaries have to support the topheavy structure by paying
high rates and by enduring poor service from inadequately maintained
plants."29 This was no doubt a sound conclusion in the context of holding
company abuses which, as in the case of Florida Company, could result in
an operating utility being bonded to as much as 100%6 or more of its net
original cost; higher rates are inevitable where excessive holding company
security structures have to be supported by "trading on a [non-existent]
equity." But with write-ups squeezed out of the corporate structure and
securities issued only against sound value, how far could the drive to
convert debt to common equity, as a hedge against the "risk of default,"
be carried in the face of increasing cost to the consumers through higher
taxes and the higher return expected from common stock investment?
Some indication of the pressure exerted by tax considerations is to be
gleaned from the 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code; these
provided that where preferred stock is issued to replace bonds or debentures
issued prior to 1942, the dividends on such stock are entitled to a limited de-
ductibility of 27% of such dividends (on the basis of present corporate
rates), thus cushioning the tax transition from debt to equity.30 The deduc-
tion, however, is considerably less favorable than the 100% deductibility of
interest, and, in any event, is not available for new financing. It was rendered
unattractive to parent holding companies as a mode of investment in sub-
sidiaries by a provision making such public utility preferred dividends
received by corporations subject to a lesser dividend credit than the 85%
credit available generally in the case of dividends from domestic cor-
porations.3 '
28. 8 S.E.C. at 389-90, 37 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 86-87.
29. S. REP. No. 621, op. cit. supra note 9, at 59.
30. INT. BEv. CoDE OF 1954, § 247.
31. INT. Rlv. CODE OF 1954, § 243. In order to bring additional pressure on holq-
ing companies to simplify their systems, the Internal Revenue Code provided for
only 85% credit for dividends received by a corporation from a domestic corporation;
this subjected dividends to a tax of 15% each time they passed through a holding corn-
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In the immediate postwar period the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion continued its efforts to bring down debt ratios in favor of common
stock investment. However, both the low interest rates for bond money
and the fact that relatively few rate regulatory commissions were as yet
prepared to compel utilities to share such savings with consumers made
the task of the Commission difficult indeed. Illustrative is a refinancing
approved for the Gulf States Utilities Company in 1946.3 That company
was permitted to call a 30-year, 3%5 bond issue, outstanding only some
seven years, at a cost of almost $2,000,000; it was also allowed to issue
new 2%% bonds and serial notes to cover the principal amount of the old
bonds plus cost to call. To harvest these interest savings the debt ratio
was permitted to increase from 49% to 51% of capitalization.3 Many other
such transactions could be noted, and by 1951, Philip Sporn, president of
American Gas & Electric Company, felt that he could report a definite
modification in the Commission's drive to convert debt to equity. Address-
ing the New York Society of Security Analysts, he made the following
comments:
I believe that perhaps the most optimistic development from a financing standpoint
that has taken place as far as the utility industry is concerned is the progress that
we have made with regulatory agencies, particularly with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, in getting across the relatively simple but very basic idea
that the road to a financing Utopia did not lie along a line of higher and higher
equity ratios. It is only a few years ago that responsible members of regulatory
bodies were preaching the gospel of salvation through higher equity ratios and
were attempting to bring practice in line with the gospel by insisting on a program
of raising equity ratios to limits presumably of the order of 50 per cent and
possibly higher. The fact that the income tax structure made that more expen-
sive money was supposed to be overbalanced by the higher price-earnings ratio
as equity ratios were raised. But this myth has been pretty well exploded, and
regulatory bodies in general are aware of the fact that, while from a standpoint
of minimum headaches to management and regulatory bodies, 100 per cent equity
ratio capital structure may be desirable, it cannot be done except at a terrific
increase in the cost of service given to the customer. As a consequence, I think
we are going to see a stabilization of equity ratios in high-grade and financially
pany. In addition, as to public utility companies, the credit for dividends on preferred
stock was further limited to approximately 62%, thus making it advantageous taxwise
for a holding company to convert preferred stock holdings in a subsidiary into common
stock holdings subject to the 85% credit. Irr. REv. CODE or 1954, § 244; 1 SEIDmAN,
LEGIsLATrVE HISTORY oF FEDEnAL INCOME AND ExcESs PROFrTs TAX LAWS 1953-1959,
at 1436-37 (1954).
32. Gulf States Util. Co., 23 S.E.C. 71 (1946).
33. Id. at 74. In connection with an earlier exchange of preferred stock the Com-
mission had, however, required a charter provision to the effect that no dividend on
common stock would be paid which would have the effect of reducing the ratio of
common stock and surplus to total capitalization below 25%. Engineers Pub. Serv. Co.,
24 S.E.C. 551, 602 (1946).-
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well-set-up companies around the level of 30 to 35 per cent. This is going to
continue to be of enormous help in keeping the cost of service down.
3 4
The Commission was charged primarily with remedying evils resulting
from the abuse of the holding company device, particularly in such
matters as control exercised through disproportionately small investment;
as to consumers, it was concerned primarily that proposed transactions
involving securities not "result in unduly burdensome fixed charges thereby
adversely affecting rates ... ."35 It was understandable that the Commis-
sion would not have articulated clearly the apparently opposed notion that
insufficient fixed charges might also adversely affect the rates which con-
sumers must pay.6
Seemingly, the Commission was willing to recognize the rate advantage
to be gained by financing through debt rather than equity only where the
consumer involved was of such stature that the normal risks of enterprise
were practically non-existent. Thus, the Commission found it possible to
approve a joint application by several companies to acquire common stock
of a generating company which was to be capitalized with 95% debt and
.5% common stock.37 Power contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission
and provisions for debt amortization were thought to be such that the
securities "involved no undue risk to the security holders despite the high
xatio of debt financing."3 The Atomic Energy Commission, as a consumer,
had negotiated rates "intended to produce revenues sufficient to provide
for operating expenses, interest at 3% per annum on its [the generating com-
pany's] debt and a return of approximately 8% on its common stock
equity."39 Other similar proposals involving generating plants to service
the AEC have subsequently been approved.40
We have noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission was
-charged primarily with remedying holding company excesses in the matter
of capitalization; it was hoped that consumer savings would be brought
about through elimination of "unnecessary" fixed charges.41 When one
turns to the decisions of the Federal Power Commission involving capitali-
zation ratios, one finds a definite shift in emphasis; this Commission is
34. Quoted in 47 PUB. UTm. FORT. 310-12 (1951).
35. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 36 S.E.C. 121, 137 (1954).
36. As early as 1942 the Commission bad noted that "for an operating company,
-we think a ratio of even 66 per cent debt and no preferred stock may well be more
.conservative than a ratio of 50 per cent debt plus 25 per cent preferred stock-a
.structure that has been thought allowable by some authorities." Jacksonville Gas Co.,
11 S.E.C. 449, 472, 45 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65, 89 (1942).
37. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 32 S.E.C. 202 (1951).
38. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 36 S.E.C. 159, 172 (1955).
39. 32 S.E.C. at 204.
40. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., supra note 38; Ohio Valley Elec. Corp., 34
.S.E.C. 323 (1952); Obio Valley Elec. Corp., 36 S.E.C. 304 (1955).
41. "[Olur inquiry into the interests of consumers is limited." -Mississippi Valley
'Generating Co., supra note 38, at 181.
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involved directly in rate regulation and in the determination of the appro-
priate costs which should underlie a schedule of rates. In this context, its
views on the appropriate ratio of debt are particularly significant. Asked
to approve a security structure of 90% debt and 10% common equity for a
generating company under contract to service an AEC project, this Com-
mission's primary interest was in the cost savings involved. Thus, in South
Carolina Generating Co. it said:
Our experience over the years has revealed that with all other factors equal, utility
companies with high debt ratios and thin equities can raise their funds at an overall
cost lower than those companies with normal ratios, i.e., lower debt ratios and
broader equities. While the debt of those companies with high debt ratios ordi-
narily will demand a higher rate, this greater cost is more than offset company-
wide by the thinness of the equity. This is true because the leverage of the thin
equity permits a tremendous potential increase in return on the common, assuming
the same overall rate of return. Due to the relative stability of utilities, investors
are willing to pay a premium for this increased earning potential.42
This heightened interest in debt ratio had its origins, of course, in the
method of determining fair return which, since Federal Power Comman v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.,43 has been constitutionally available to this Com-
mission. Under this method the Commission has been free to determine a
differentiated rate of return as follows: the composite contractual rate on
the utility's outstanding debt and an allowance for common equity (arrived
at by adjusting the appropriate earnings-price ratio for the common stock
by "other factors considered by investors") are composited; this composited
rate is applied to the net investment of the utility in property and working
capital.44 It is apparent that under this method of return determination
the amount of low cost debt in the calculation is of great significance: the
greater the percentage of low cost debt, the smaller the resultant composite
over-all cost. It matters not that the investor expectation for common
equity advances as the percentage of debt increases; the savings from debt
issuance are usually substantially greater than the additional allowance
necessary for the common stock.45 Of course, the Federal Power Commis-
sion would probably not approve 90% debt for electric utilities, except in
the unusual circumstances presented by a utility firm having a long-term
power contract directly or indirectly with the AEC and having common
stock which is to be subscribed by a parent utility.4 In fact, in fixing
rates for power to be sold for other than AEC purposes, the Commission
in South Carolina Generating Co. allowed the return to be calculated on
the basis of the more conservative capital structure of the corporate parent;
42. 19 F.P.C. 855, 857, 23 P.U.R.3d 499, 501-02 (1958).
43. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
44. Id. at 601-03.




this structure consisted of some 63% debt, 9% preferred stock, and 28%
common equity. In this way the Commission allowed the fruits of trading
on a disproportionately small equity to inure in substantial part to the
corporate parent rather than to be passed on to the consumer.47
Where the Federal Power Commission has been called on to approve
capital structures in connection with the determination of rates for the
transportation and sale of natural gas, it has needed no special considera-
tions to warrant approval of debt ratios up to 75% and common equity
ratios as low as 15%. However, in approving a rate application from
Houston Texas Gas & Oil Corp. and Coastal Transmission Corp.,48 the
Commission indicated that it regarded 15% common equity as a minimum
to assure a "reasonable standard of safety":
The initial capitalization here contemplated for both companies of less than 15
per cent in equity and the remainder in debt would result in such a large portion
of the income of the companies being spent for debt service as to leave very
little margin for times when economic conditions are less favorable. . . . In the
order below we will therefore provide that both companies shall file amended plans
of financing to provide that equity capital shall consist of at least 15 per cent of
the total capitalization.49
Here again the Commission uses a somewhat hybrid version of the
differentiated return or cost of capital approach. In countering the Coastal
applicant's case for an over-all 6%% return, the Commission found as fol-
lows:
If each company finances, as we shall require, with a 15 per cent common equity
ratio, and the remainder of the capitalization is 73 per cent in bonds with a cost
of, for example, 484 per cent (instead of the proposed interest rate of 4.5 per cent)
and 12 per cent in interim notes with a cost of 5.5 per cent, an overall rate of
return for either company of 6 per cent would result in a return on equity of
approximately 14 per cent, which is excessive. . . . To remedy these defects in
Coastal's proposals we shall require that the tariff to be filed by Coastal shall
provide initially for. a rate of return of 6 per cent and that the rate of return to
be used in the cost-of-service formula shall be recalculated every six months.50
Such treatment might be construed as permitting the common stock-
holder to "trade on the equity" to a limited extent but within an over-all
ceiling on rate of return. A true differentiated return would require an
allowance for the common stock to be independently determined from
comparative market data; such an allowance would only fortuitously equate
to 6% over-all when combined with the contractual rate on debt and the
47. Ibid. The utility's corporate parent argued that it would have to abnormally in-
crease its own common equity to offset the low equity capital ratio of its subsidiary,
thus justifying absorption of the savings.
48. Houston Tex. Gas & Oil Corp., 16 F.P.C. 118, 16 P.U.R.3d 333 (1956).
49. Id. at 140, 16 P.U.R.3d at 356.
50. Id. at 137, 16 P.U.R.3d at 352-53.
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dividend rate on preferred stock.5'
The natural urge on the part of the common stockholders to keep the
fruits of trading on the equity can sometimes be enlarged upon in the ob-
scure processes of rate-making, as witness a development previously alluded
to in connection with South Carolina Generating Co. In order to obtain
an AEC contract, rates were negotiated sufficient to cover operating ex-
penses, interest on debt, and a fixed return for the common equity. Oper-
ating expenses in this context included income taxes; in the computation of
these taxes, interest on the debt had been taken as a deduction (the higher
the debt ratio in the capitalization, the larger the amount of interest de-
ductible, the smaller the taxes and total operating expenses, and as a final
consequence, the lower the rates which can be quoted). Having obtained
a long-term contract on this basis but having excess power to sell over the
demands of the contract, the generating company and its common stock-
holder, Georgia Power Company, sought Commission approval on a rate
for such excess power. The debt ratio problem was given a new twist.
Rates for the public were sought to be set as though the favorable debt
ratio did not exist or, in any event, as though it was offset by the necessity
on the part of the parent company to improve its common equity because
of the "thin" equity of its subsidiary.52 The parent, Georgia Power, sug-
gested that a theoretical corporate structure of only 50% debt was more
appropriate for the public rates; this would increase operating expenses by
means of higher taxes, lowered interest cost, and increased allowance for
the common at a rate three or four times the cost of interest on debt for
the same dollars of capitalization. To this argument, the Commission an-
swered:
This is an attempt to enjoy the benefits of the high-debt financing, i.e., the con-
struction of low-cost capacity and the consequent sale to du Pont, while making
Georgia Power Company and ultimately the consumers in Georgia assume fictitious
costs. As such, the allowance proposed by Generating Company is unreasonable.
We have consistently held that the allowance for taxes should not exceed taxes
paid. . . . Accordingly, the income tax allowance in this proceeding should be
based upon the actual interest deduction of the Generating Company for that is
the basis upon which it will pay its taxes.
5 3
The Federal Power Commission, dealing only with electric and gas
utilities, could maintain quite readily that it would have no traffic with
hypothetical debt structures and their interest and tax consequences: the
industry with which it dealt was one which looked to the public markets
for investment funds, traditionally using predominantly senior securities.
While the Securities and Exchange Commission's administration of the
51. See GLAnSER, PUBLIC Unmrrrxs iN AM micAN CAPrrAIxs.IS 388 (1957).
52. South C. Generating Co., 16 F.P.C. 52, 61-66, 15 P.U.R.3d 289, 300-03 (1956).
53. Id. at 65, 15 P.U.R.3d at 303. This position was adhered to on remand. See 249
F.2d 755, 764 (1957); 23 P.U.R.3d 499, 503-06 (1958).
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Holding Company Act had brought substantial pressure upon utility man-
agements to look to common stock as a source of capital supply as well as
a means of control in order to bring down debt ratio, the Federal Power
Commission did not maintain that pressure to the same degree but was
content with such modest equity ratios as we have seen; commendably, it
sought also to force a sharing of the savings from high debt ratios with the
consumers. It required no urging for these utilities to "trade on the equity"
in order to obtain needed capital.
III.
In the Bell system, the Federal Communications Commission is faced
with a regulatee whose attitude towards debt is, by the standards of the
natural gas and even the electric industry, staunchly conservative. As the
Commission reported to Congress in 1939:
In contrast to certain public-utility holding companies with pyramided capital
structures which made them subject to the accentuated impact of diminishing
earnings during times of business depression, the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company common-stockholder is, by and large, subject only to the direct influ-
ence of changes in the gross and net earnings, without the element of accentuation
due to leverage.54
The Commission also noted:
The capital structure of the Bell System, on account of a small proportion of long-
term debt in comparison with total capitalization, creates a safety of equity invest-
ment which is rarely equaled by other public-utility systems, which usually have a
much higher ratio of fixed income-bearing securities. . . . [T]he net income
available to the stockholder of the American Co. has shown a stability commen-
surate with the stability of the earnings of the telephone system as a whole, which,
though it has varied, has never reached dangerously low levels or the vanishing
point, because of the comparative stability of rates and the essential need for the
service.w5
The above statements were made as part of a final report by the Com-
mission on a broad investigation into the telephone industry authorized by
Congress in 1935. Because of budget and time limitations the investigation
had to be confined largely to the operations of the American Company;
the Congressional charge extended, however, to all interstate telephone
operations and specifically to "corporate and financial history; capital
structure; . . . apportionment of investments, revenues, and expense be-
tween State and interstate operations; ... the effect of monopolistic control
upon the reasonableness of telephone rates and charges; and the reasons
for the failure generally to reduce telephone rates and charges during the
54. Federal Communications Commission Report, Investigation of the Telephone




years of declining prices."56 One of the immediate results of the investiga-
tion was a substantial decrease in telephone rates "effected as a result of
conferences between the Commission and the company without the neces-
sity of legal proceedings."57 The longer run effects were said to be as
follows:
The investigation has resulted in the development and the analysis of a large and
important fund of data which is ample to form the foundation upon which adequate
regulatory machinery may be constructed. Data developed have proved of value
to State commissions in meeting the problems with which they are confronted in
the regulation of intrastate rates of telephone companies.58
Since the reduction in long distance rates, alluded to above, was worked
out in conference, it is not known what precise considerations were taken
into account in effecting it; it seems extremely likely, however, that the
"cost of money" factor played a very important role. In any event, concern
with this problem resulted in a staff study of rate of return or "cost of
money" which could well have had significance in negotiating lower long
distance rates.5 9 The staff study noted at the outset that in 1937 American's
long distance operation represented an investment of $328,000,000; conse-
quently, a variation of 1% in the rate of return would amount to $3,280,000
in annual charges to subscribers. 60 In 1938 "after more than a quarter of
a century of regulatory experience," the staff thought it significant "that
very little is to be found in court decisions, or in the standard works on
public utilities, respecting the basic principles which must necessarily
underlie any systematic determination of the rate of return."61
The staff selected for study "rate of return determination by comparison
to costs of capital incurred by other utilities"; this topic had been suggested
by the United States Supreme Court in Bluefield Water Works & Improve-
ment Co. v. Public Service Comm'jr.62 In that case, decided during the same
term in which Justice Brandeis made his historic attack on the "fair value"
method,63 the Court theorized as follows on the appropriate rate of return:
A public utility is entitled to such rate as will permit it to earn a return on the
value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to
that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the
56. Id. pt. XVII.
57. FCC, ANN. REP. 30 (1940).
58. FCC, ANN. REp. 19 (1939).
59. FCC, THE PROBLEm OF THE RATE OF Rm'uuN IN PuBLIc UTILITY REGULATION
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LONG LINEs DEPARTMENT or TnE ArmucAN TELx-
PHONE AND TELEGRAPH CoMPANY (1938).
60. Id. at 2.
61. Ibid.
62. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).




country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by
corresponding risks and uncertainties... 64
The data and conclusions of the study have fulfilled at least one of the
announced objectives: state regulatory commissions were supplied with
information which they might use in meeting the problems confronting
them in the regulation of intrastate rates of telephone companies.
Two aspects of the study are of interest in considering the problem of
determining an appropriate debt ratio for rate-making purposes. The first
dealt with "experienced capital costs as a measure of return requirements."
Data was gleaned from selected large telephone, electric, and gas utilities
having publicly traded stockys Conclusions were sought as to the relation
between overall costs and the percentage of debt and common equity. The
results indicated a somewhat lower over-all cost of money for companies
with over 60% common equity than those with less than 60%. The staff
thought other factors not taken into account would prevent this aspect of
the study from being taken "as conclusive evidence that a large proportion
of common stock tends towards low over-all capital costs." However, the
staff thought it "clearly established that a large proportion of stock in the
capital structure does not necessarily result in high-cost financing, when
costs of capital are measured by the methods used herein." The methods
alluded to were (1) the compositing of costs of capital for the bonds and
common stocks of selected companies determined from market data over
a ten year period and (2) the relating of this composite cost to the
proportion of debt and common stock in the capitalization.
The other interesting aspect of the study supplied one of the substantial
reasons for the tentative nature of the staff's conclusions. This facet of the
investigation was an analysis of investor's appraisals of utility securities. A
more extensive sampling of telephone, electric and gas utilities was made
than in the first-mentioned aspect of the study.P The results indicated
that from 40 to 50% might be the optimum proportion for bonds and that,
in combination with common stock, this range yielded the lowest over-all
cost of capital. 67 In the study, data was arranged so as to demonstrate the
effects of income stability and earnings coverage of fixed charges as well
as the effect of debt and common stock ratios in the capitalization. The
examination of the bond issues of Bell system companies clearly demon-
strated the effect on bond yields and earnings-price ratios of the conserva-
tive financial management and resulting high credit of the American
Company and its subsidiaries. The results of the studies were "consistent
with the common-sense observation that when interest requirements are
64. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Co., supra note 62,
at 692.
65. FCC, op. cit. supra note 59, at 155-79.
66. Id. at 105-54.
67. Id. at 152 table 13.
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already well covered, additional earnings do not make much difference
while under more doubtful conditions, a small change in coverage may
mean a considerable difference in investors appraisals."m The study con-
cludes by stating that if American's long distance operation had been
separately incorporated, "its securities would be at least as attractive to
investors as those of individual Bell companies which do have securities
in the hands of the public."69 The Commission staff reached no clear cut
conclusion on the effects of a high equity ratio and a low debt ratio on the
over-all cost of money; therefore no proposals were made that, in determin-
ing a rate of return for the long distance operation, a hypothetical debt
ratio should be introduced. The staff's suggestion of a proposed rate
appeared to be based on the existing capitalization of American, in effect
pro-rated to the long distance operation. Since the constitutional apparatus
of "fair value" had not yet been scrapped by the United States Supreme
Court, the rate of return arrived at was deemed applicable, at least to a
net-investment base consisting of the cost of property in service plus
worldng capital and supplies less reserve for depreciation; the use of the
capitalization itself as a rate base had yet to be accepted.70
IV.
How did the state commissions develop the role of debt ratio, earnings
coverage, and related income tax savings as factors in rate regulation? A
sampling of the work of the Michigan commission may serve to illustrate;
during the two decades since the FCC studies this commission has been
ably staffed and led by astute commissioners.
Following the 1944 decision of Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., which freed regulatory commissions from the "fair value" formula
and made possible the use of "cost of capital-prudent investment"
methods,71 the Michigan Public Service Commission initiated rate reduction
proceedings against all utilities in the state subject to excess profit taxes.72
Included among the companies was Michigan Bell Telephone Company;
it was found to be accruing excess profit taxes for the year 1944.7- Freed
from "fair value" restraints, the commission's expert witness approached the
problem of fixing just and reasonable rates by constructing a differentiated
68. Id. at 125.
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id. at 187.
71. "Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached
not the method employed which is controlling. . . . From the investor or company
point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating
expenses but also for the capital costs of the business .... service on the debt and
.... return to the equity owner... commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks." 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944).
72. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 62 P.U.R. (n.s.) 77, 79 (1945).
73. Ibid.
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rate of return. In determining this rate, he first observed that "the utility
industry... [generally] has a capital structure which absorbs considerably
more than 30 per cent [of net operating income] for fixed charges. The
Bell System as a whole, on a consolidated basis, absorbs somewhat less
than that figure, a figure running 25 per cent or, in some cases, less than
25 per cent."74 The witness then submitted calculations showing
the overall cost of capital to a company on the assumption that it is going to finance
to the point where bond interest absorbs 30 per cent of the total income available;
the balance of 70 per cent is allocated to stock payments, where the assumed
cost of the capital raised by bonds is to the company 2.735 per cent; and where
the assumed cost of the capital acquired by stocks is 6.56 per cent.75
He concluded that on such a basis "the overall estimated cost of capital
would be 4.62 per cent; and those assumptions would result in a capital
structure of 50.69 per cent in bonds, and 49.31 per cent in stocks," and that
he "would consider such a capital structure to be a reasonable structure
in the utility industry, or in the telephone industry." The witness noted
that such a capital structure for a telephone utility would not be "incon-
sistent with capital structures that already exist extensively in the utility
industry." His studies showed that the "utility industry, as a whole, is
financed on a capital structure, . . which shows out of total capital bonds
in the amount of approximately 46 per cent; preferred stock in the amount
of approximately 15 per cent .. .and common stock and surplus in the
amount of some 39 per cent."76
The Michigan commission, however, was not quite ready to fix rates
directly on the basis of the average capital structure for the utility industry;
nor was it ready to fix capital structure based on devoting 30% of net
operating income to interest on a 51% debt ratio at current interest rates.
Instead it assumed that the cost of capital for Michigan Bell was identical
with the cost of capital of another Bell subsidiary which had publicly held
common stock and which it found comparable. Such cost of capital was
based on a capitalization of 30%5 debt and 70% equity, which was substan-
tially the "historical" capitalization of the consolidated Bell companies; it
calculated out to 4.72% on an over-all composite or differentiated basis and
supported an order to decrease gross revenues $3,500,000. 7
While review of this decrease order was pending in the courts of
74. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 39, 50
N.W.2d 826, 840 (1952), affirming 62 P.U.R. (n.s.) 77 (1945). Earnings coverage of
fixed charges can, of course, be expressed either as the percentage which fixed charges
(interest primarily) bears to total net operating income or as the number of times net
operating income covers such fixed charges.
75. Id. at 841.
76. Id. at 840.
77. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., supra note 72, at 82.
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Michigan,78 the utility filed in 1947 for an increase of $10,500,000 based
on the alleged need of the company for a 6.53% composite return on net
investment in property in order to satisfactorily attract capital7 9 Due to
the exigencies of post-war financing, the Bell system was at this time
borrowing heavily and the request was based on actual system capitalization
which approached a 50% debt ratio. The utility made a strong plea for
substantially increased earnings for the common equity so that common
stock financing could be immediately resorted to in order to restore a
"conservative" capital structure. It was urged that the rate of earnings
for Michigan Bell should be adequate to support the market price of the
common stock of the American Company at a price "reasonably" above
the book value, in order to permit sales of additional stock without impair-
ing the existing stockholder's position. This rate of return on common
equity was said to be 8.67%; presumably it would, if granted, enable
American to market common stock in quantities such as to bring its debt
ratio down toward its "historical" objectives of 30 to 35.8O
A financial expert was again called on by the Michigan commission to
make cost of capital studies; he found that interest rates were now at a
level where devotion of a conservative 20 to 25% of net operating income
to fixed charges (fixed charges earned four to five times) resulted in a
recommended debt ratio of 39 to 46% and a over-all composite cost of
capital of from 5.7 to 6%, based on a weighted average earnings-price ratio
of 7.13% for Bell system common stock.81 The commission thought an
over-all 6% return would enable the utility to meet the "full requirements of
the company's funded debt, if any, and a reasonable dividend upon the
capital stock of the company, and allow a reasonable addition to be made
to the company's earned surplus."82 It expressed no concern over restoring
the utility capitalization to a more conservative, lower debt ratio; since it
was the assumption of an almost 40% debt ratio (and a 3.1% interest rate)
which made a 6% over-all rate of return a possible result, this was under-
standable. The commission nonetheless granted $8,200,000 of the $10,500,000
requested increase in gross revenues.P
The ink was hardly dry on this "6%" order when a new application was
filed for an additional $20,400,000 of gross operating revenues.8 Again, the
additional revenues were urged to be necessary in order to improve the
earnings position of American common stock, thus making possible addi-
tional common stock financing and encouraging the conversion of outstand-
78. The administrative order was judicially affirmed. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michi-
gan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra note 74.
79. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 75 P.U.R. (n.s.) 436, 460-63 (1948).
80. Ibid.
81. Id. at 463-65.
82. Id. at 465.
83. Ibid.
84. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R. (n.s.) 327 (1950).
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ing convertible debentures into common stock. But now the deterring
effect of debt ratio on higher rates was plainly evident, for a capital
structure of 33% debt at 3% and 67% equity at even 9% yielded a composite
return of only 7%; a 7% return on invested capital did not warrant any such
substantial increase in revenues as $20,400,000Ps Furthermore, the Michigan
commission had just approved a 40% debt ratio and a 67 over-all composite
rate as adequate, on the assumption that an 8% rate for equity would make
common stock financing and debenture conversion sufficiently attractive.86
At this point a happy blending of seemingly incongruous approaches to
rate determination provided a solution. The utility had proposed a 7%
return, not on an investment rate base but on fair value rate base (denomi-
nated however, not fair value but "current investment cost").87 The result
on debt ratio and return on common equity was striking; 33% debt out of
an actual investment of $280,000,000 was $92,400,000, but if the rate base
was lifted to $360,000,000 by using "current investment cost," the debt of
$92,400,000, contracted in fixed dollars, became not 33% but 26% of the
base. Interest centers not so much on such refinements with respect to debt
ratio, however, as on the dollar effect of applying an over-all composite rate
of return of 7%, which the original debt and equity ratios had yielded at
3% and 8% respectively; 7% applied to a rate base of $360,000,000 obviously
yielded a great many more dollars of return than 7% applied to $280,000,000.
The Michigan commission might at this point have maintained its
previous findings that 3% on the actual Bell system debt, apportioned to
the Michigan operations, was realistic and appropriate and that 8% on the
remaining actual common equity was likewise appropriate; instead it
decided another increase for the common stock was in order but that it
should be achieved, not by specifically increasing the rate of return on the
actual common equity, but by accepting fair value and thus increasing the
base to which the over-all composite rate of return was to be applied. The
commission thus preserved the theory of a 40% debt ratio and a 6% composite
rate of return. Its conclusion in this respect is interesting:
We do not believe that the present fair value of the property of the utility is,
could, or should be either the original cost, as above indicated, or the rate base in
terms of 1949 dollars, as indicated by the computation of current costs, but we
are of the opinion that the present fair value lies somewhere between these two
figures. It is, in its final analysis, a matter of judgment to be exercised by the
Commission. It should and must be the result of a thorough, careful, honest, and
impartial consideration of all the various elements in the case bearing upon this
subject. It must be a result of a realistic approach giving due weight to the stage
85. The staff recommended an overall return of 5.7% which when applied to invested
capital resulted in "required" earnings of less than the actual earnings for the test
period. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., supra note 84, at 356 (dissenting commissioner's
analysis).
86. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., supra note 79, at 464-65.
87. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., supra note 84, at 342-43.
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of the economic cycle in which we are living, and it is important to note at this
juncture that to adopt in mere words the philosophy of fair value and to arrive at
a dollar result coequal in amount with original cost is merely a play on words and
paying lip-service to this important and fundamental principle. We do not propose
to thus toy with this all important phase of the case before us.
Upon a careful consideration of all the elements entering into the formation
of a sound judgment upon the matter of present fair value, we deem and decide
that the present fair value, or rate base, for the purposes of this case is the sum
of $350,000,000.88
The commission did not remind itself that realistically it was approving,
not a 40% debt ratio with accompanying coverage for fixed charges, but a
32% debt ratio with commensurately increased coverage of fixed charges. A
dissenting commissioner thought the fair value approach of his colleagues
"nebulously" contrived and difficult to reconcile with the need for a
"consistent standard."8 9
The commission had had some second thoughts about its handling of the
rate base problem by the time an application for a further increase was
made the following year.9 While not excluded, the evidence on fair value
or "current investment cost" as termed by the utility was found "not ...
to be conclusive of any of the issues in [the rate increase] proceeding."9'
Instead, the commission ordered the production of operating and cost of
capital data as prepared by the comptroller for the Bell system and its
corporate and state segments. In the context of actual capitalization rather
than fair value or "current investment cost," it was found that the debt
ratio had a substantial effect indeed upon over-all rate of return and upon
return for the common equity. The following hypothetical example was
found "worthy of thoughtful study": 92
$1,000,000 Investment at 6% Rate of Return Under
Alternative Capitalizations
(A)% Debt (B) Y Debt
@ 3%@
%Equity %Equity
Necessary earnings after taxes $ 60,000 $ 60,000
Bond interest requirement 10,000 15,000
Balance available for common $ 50,000 $ 45,000
Amount of common equity $666,667 $500,000
88. Id. at 343-44. (Emphasis added.)
89. Id. at 355-56.
90. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 90 P.U.R. (n.s.) 20 (1951).
91. Id. at 24.
92. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129, 145 (1951).
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Return on equity capital 7.5% 9%
Necessary gross income before
taxes $104,340 $ 99,906
Total taxes at 4% (after bond
interest) $ 44,340 $ 39,906
Gross income after taxes (required
earnings) $ 60,000 $ 60,000
The commission was impressed with the fact that as a result of the lower
cost of debt and the tax savings incident thereto, a 6% over-all return meant
a 9% return on common equity to the company with 50% debt and only
7.5% on common equity to the company with 33% debt. It found income
before taxes would have to decline 90% in Case (A) and 85% in Case (B)
before bond interest would not be covered. Other data indicated to the
commission that stock purchasers gave only slightly greater weight to a
four or more times interest and preferred dividend coverage as compared
with a two and a half times coverage in demanding dividend yield and
earnings-price ratio; the larger coverage indicated, from a sample of 14
large utilities, a dividend yield of 5.34% and the lesser coverage a dividend
yield of 6.26%.93 If the implications of these data were reliable, the commis-
sion might feel that it had indeed realized the alchemist's dream of turning
lead to gold; a greater amount of debt could result in a lower over-all cost
of capital because the increased cost of common capital might not absorb
all of the savings in interest resulting.94
The commission was persuaded as to the validity of this approach in
determining whether increased revenues were warranted. It concluded that
an over-all rate of return of between 6.3% and 6.5% presented a "zone of
reasonableness"; it arrived at this "zone" on the basis of the following
components of capital cost: 95
Per cent Per cent
of of
capital Rate Cost capital Rate Cost
Debt capital 40% 3.00% 1.20% 45% 3.00% 1.35%
Equity capital 60% 8.33% 5.30% 55% 9.00% 4.95%
Combined cost 100% 6.50% 100% 6.30%
93. Id. at 146.
94. Ibid. This would follow since incremental debt could be added at somewhat
more than 3% and displace higher cost common equity without increasing the cost of
the remaining common equity enough to absorb the interest savings.
95. Id. at 149.
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These rates of return, when applied to a rate base consisting of average
capital obligations6 for the test period, yielded a range of required net
operating revenues in dollars. The next step by the commission was to
measure actual revenues, with certain adjustments, against this range of
reasonableness. Despite the utility's protest against "regulation by adjust-
ment," the commission included among its adjustments and added to actual
reported net operating income for the test period an item for potential
saving in income tax resulting from the larger interest deduction incident
to a 45% debt ratio, over the actual interest deduction on a 23% debt ratio,
Here, indeed, was another alchemist's touch since such taxes would of
course have to be paid until the interest deductions did in fact exist.
However, if the utility chose not to achieve the debt ratio found prudent
and appropriate by the commission, the additional taxes paid or to be paid
by the utility were said to be in the nature of an "unavoidable expense"
subject to being disallowed; if so disallowed they would have to be
absorbed by the common stockholder in addition to the decrease in return
on that part of the common stock treated as debt in increasing debt ratio
from an actual 23% to an assumed 45%.97 With this adjustment and certain
others having to do with intrasystem service and profits, the actual net
operating revenues were found to be above the "zone of reasonableness"
and hence not in need of further increase.
The Michigan commission seemed persuaded that in the corporate
capitalization, or "capital obligations," it had a satisfactory rate base which
permitted it to use "consistent methods and deal with accurate and review-
96. Id. at 150. Adoption of "capital obligations" as a rate base by the commission
was no doubt made possible by the requirement that the utility comptroller reports
be submitted in evidence for an appropriate period. For its own purposes, as distin-
guished from rate-making purposes, the pertinent results appear from such reports to
be the percentage of debt obligations to total capital obligations, consisting of debt,
common stock, and surplus, and the net operating income to average capital obligations.
Capital obligations may be substantially less than the so-called "investment" base con-
sisting of net property and working capital because some of the "investment" may be
carried by advance collections from subscribers for taxes and fees which due to a lag
between collection and payment by the utility make funds available to the utility on
an indefinite basis.
97. The commission noted that "with today's income taxes . . . each dollar of gross
earnings that can be shifted from equity earnings to bond interest saves about one-half
,,dollar of tax money which . . . means that substantially higher debt ratios are now
more desirable than the lower ratios that may have been necessary in former years."
Id. at 145. In an earlier rate appeal the Michigan Supreme Court bad itself concluded
that "the exclusion [from operating expenses] of an unnecessary element, such as
avoidable taxes .... " was within commission rate-making authority. Detroit v. Michi-
gan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 308 Mich. 706, 717, 54 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65, 66 (1944). (Emphasis
added.) The status of income taxes as an operating expense had been settled in
Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922). Early recognition to the
fact that "the capital structure of a company has a marked effect on the amount of
income taxes paid, and hence should be considered in determining a reasonable rate
of return" was given by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission in Barron County
Tel. Co., 1933E P.U.R. 403, 419.
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able facts." It thought "the rate base should not be an estimate, subject
to constantly changing price levels." Consequently, when it was again
confronted with fair value or "current investment cost" evidence in the
Bell application for an increase in 1953,99 it made very short shrift of it,
saying:
In utility rate increase proceedings a rate base is generally determined to which
net income can be related .... The use of the average capitalization eliminates
the necessity of computing working capital and its many intricacies. It eliminates
the necessity of a decision as to the inclusion of plant under construction. It fur-
ther eliminates the problem of deciding whether all or a portion of the plant held
for future use should be included or excluded." The applicant has urged the
commission to consider other elements in considering the rate base, as indicated
hereinbefore. These items appear to be put forward to enable the commission to
authorize higher charges to the public without causing the earnings expressed in
percentage to be higher than the returns heretofore approved. We see no justifica-
tion for beguiling the public by adopting a low relative rate of return and relating
it to an unreal, speculative, mythical, and excessive rate base.10o
Relegated to making a case for increased earnings on the basis of an
actual "capital obligations" rate base, the utility urged strongly that the
risks of the telephone industry were such that a debt ratio of only 33% was
warranted, even though electric and gas utilities might have ratios up to
50% and higher. This was an apparent attempt to counter the discovery
which the commission thought it had made, namely that the over-all cost
of capital can actually be less for a utility with a large amount of debt.
The utility urged that "over-all cost of capital is about the same regardless
of the capital structure, but that costs of specific kinds of capital do vary
with the structure (the market behavior being such as to cause the
weighted over-all cost to stay constant) and that, therefore, component
costs developed on one structure cannot properly be applied to another
structure."1 0 1
The utility further urged that a 40 to 45% debt ratio was not warranted
because the telephone enterprise was more risky than other utilities and
consequently required the protection of a debt ratio and accompanying
earnings coverage of not more than 33%.102 But the commission was now
disposed to test alleged earnings and debt ratio requirements by market
analysis; such analysis indicated that reduction in debt ratio, while evidently
designed to promote American bonds from Aa to Aaa without change in
the over-all cost of money, might actually increase the over-all cost of
money since equity money might advance in cost because of the accom-
98. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 301, 310 (1954).
99. ibid.
100. Id. at 308, 310.
101. Id. at 317.
102. Ibid.
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panying decrease in "leverage."10 3 The commission thought "the facts quite
definitely indicate that a 40 per cent ratio would not only give a lower cost,
but would also provide a very adequate degree of safety and would main-
tain the credit of the system at a highly satisfactory level."'104 The com-
mission adjusted actual reported net operating income upwards almost
$1,000,000 for income taxes which would have been "saved" if a 40% debt
ratio had been maintained. 05 Again the return of the common stockholder
was reduced by such theoretical tax savings plus the theoretical saving in
interest on the segment of common equity treated as debt at 3.1%. It found
that no reasons had been sufficiently developed for increasing the rate of
eaings. 6
The brave words of the commission uttered in 1954 as to the virtues of a
"capital obligations" rate base and of consistency in rate determinations
were tempered in 1957;107 although noting that "the staff insists that the
capitalization rate base includes all the capital provided by the investors
in Michigan Bell Telephone Company," the commission nonetheless now
transferred its allegiance to an "investment" or net property rate base,
including in the "base" substantial capital allocated from the corporate
parent as funds available for loan to the subsidiary. The commission rather
apologetically stated: "We are mindful that the rate base we have adopted
exceeds the amount actually invested in the securities of the applicant but
it does represent the applicant's actual investment in plant used in providing
telephone service in Michigan, without regard to the original source of such
funds." 08
The base approved was some $45,000,000 above actual pro-rated capital
obligations, a fact with important implications when it is considered that
allowable dollars of net operating revenue are arrived at by applying a
composite over-all rate of return percentage to the selected dollar rate
base.10 9 The commission adhered to an assumed debt ratio of 40%, taking
103. Id. at 321. As described in GRAHAm & DoDD, SEcuarry ANALYSIS 556 (1951),
"[T]he presence of a substantial proportion of senior capital, carrying a limited charge
for interest or preferred dividends, permits the relatively small common issue to benefit
from the earnings of a much larger capital fund." Leverage is of course a much sub-
dued operative factor in the high equity capital structures of the Bell system.
104. 5 P.U.R.3d at 322.
105. The commission said that "to assume a lower debt ratio (than 40%] for tax
computations would constitute passing on to the ratepayers an avoidable expense and
an unnecessary burden." Id. at 315.
106. Id. at 326.
107. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 397 (1957).
108. Id. at 405. (Emphasis added.) A foundation for the transition was laid in
rehearing the 1953 application for an increase. The result of an increase granted was
carefully portrayed in terms of a rate of return on capital obligations and a rate of
return on investment in net property; the latter base, containing as it did property
carried by advance collections from subscribers, indicated the more modest rate of
return resulting from the granted increase. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 321,
324 (1955).
109. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 397 (1957).
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into account the higher interest rates prevailing in 1957. It arrived at an
earnings allowance for 60% common equity based on earnings-price ratios,
making appropriate adjustments for the fact that the common equity rate
was to be applied to book equity rather than the market values from which
the ratios were drawn.110 The result was an over-all rate of 6.6%, however,
not dollars necessary to service actual debt and common stock or to service
actual total capital obligations assuming 40% debt."' A composite rate of
6.6% applied to a rate base $45,000,000 greater than the capital obligations
of the utility will obviously yield more dollars than will the component
parts of that composite rate when applied to the lesser amount of capital
obligations themselves. The commission was of course aware that the
determination of a composite rate of return from a percentage allocation of
capital obligations at appropriate rates for the types of capital and the
application of this composite rate, not to total capital obligations but to a
larger net property rate base, was simply a way of allowing more earnings
for the actual common stock investment than indicated by the common
equity rate selected to be composited with the interest rate. It had earlier
said that a capitalization rate base (the actual capital invested) "appears
fair and equitable to both the ratepayer and the investors. Its use insures
the inclusion of every dollar invested in the company by its bondholders
and its common stock owners"; it had also said in rejecting a fair value rate
base that it saw "no justification for beguiling the public by adopting a low
relative rate of return and relating it to an unreal, speculative, mythical, and
excessive rate base."1 2 It might have at least pondered the applicability of
this comment to its 1957 procedure. Nonetheless, it must be said that the
commission did adhere to its position that a 40% debt ratio and the accom-
panying savings in interest and income taxes must be taken into account,
thus tempering the dollars of additional revenues deemed necessary." 3
By 1960 even the commission's debt ratio position had been subjected to
further reflection and was modified under the continuing and evidently
persuasive arguments of the utility." 4 For reasons which do not appear in
the commission's opinion, a property rate base including an allocation from
the parent's loan capital was not considered in 1960; instead, the utility
submitted a fair value base and a net investment base consisting of net
property at cost plus working capital. The commission staff urged a capitali-
zation rate base with an assumption of 40% debt and 60% common
110. Id. at 408.
111. Ibid. The determination of an over-all rate may be presented arithmetically as
follows:
40% debt @ 3.15 = 1.26% on total capital
60% equity @ 8.8 = 5.34% on total capital
Composite = 6.60% on total capital
112. 5 P.U.R.3d at 308.
113. 20 P.U.R.3d at 407-08.
114. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 395 (1960).
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equity;" 5 the actual debt ratio was 26.4% and the equity 73.6%.116 By way
of preparation for a change in position, the commission majority noted (1)
that the Hope decision did not bind it to the use of any single formula or
combination of formulae, (2) that rate-making involved the making of
"pragmatic adjustments" and (3) that "it is the result reached not the
method employed, which is controlling."" 7 The majority's pragmatic
adjustments to commission staff proposals are an interesting response to
utility persuasion.
The staff had again urged a 40% debt ratio and 60% common equity, with
an allowance for current and imbedded interest costs, plus an allowance of
earnings for the common stock based on studies of current earnings-price
ratios of comparable investments; this resulted in a recommended over-all
rate of return of 6.52% of capitalization; translated into dollars this rep-
resented about a 6% relationship to net property. The utility urged that it
required 8% on net "investment" (net property plus working capital) to
service its 26% debt ratio and 74% common equity. But the utility also took
a new "hard" line that debt ratio was actually no concern of the commis-
sion's and that "no adjustment of any sort in federal income tax is proper."
It took the position that "such an adjustment infringes on management's
financial authority, makes the earnings of a reasonable return impossible,
and results in a double disallowance ...."118 The utility asked for 8% on
a net "investment" (net property plus working capital) of $588,000,000, but
only $543,000,000 of this investment was carried by bondholder and stock-
holder capital; the remaining $45,000,000 of "investment" was carried by
advance collections for taxes and other items.119 Thus the utility was
actually asking for a return of 8.5% on total capital obligations. The com-
mission staff, however, found that $543,000,000, divided into 40% debt and
60% common equity, could both attract capital from the public markets and
be serviced with some $35,000,000 of net operating revenue, or at a rate
of approximately 6.5% (taking into account current market trends in cost of
money). Turning to the actual earnings of the utility and adjusting for
wage increases and other items, it found some $36,000,000 of net operating
revenue, before taking into account $1,000,000 in income taxes which would
be saved by a 40% debt ratio; thus it found potentially available a net
operating revenue of $37,000,000 or at the rate of 6.8% on capital obliga-
tions.120 Since net operating revenue "available" exceeded the utility's
requirements, as indicated by market studies, no increase was recommended.
Nevertheless, a majority of the commission was convinced that some
115. Id. at 399-401.
116. Id. at 406.
117. Id. at 400.
118. Id. at 399.
119. Note 96 supra.
120. 32 P.U.R.3d at 398-99.
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increase had to be granted and set about making the pragmatic adjustments
necessary to justify an increase. They decided that a 35% debt ratio rather
than a 40% ratio was now appropriate; the result was to reduce "available"
present earnings by some $500,000 of income tax "saving." The majority
also decided that the entire property and working capital should be treated
as though carried by bondholder and stockholder capital, thus requiring a
return on some $45,000,000 of capital provided by subscribers to insure the
common stockholder; including an increase in the over-all rate from the
proposed 6.5% to 6.6%, the result was an estimated required increase in net
operating revenues of some $1,900,000 and in gross operating revenues of
some $4,000,000.121
A dissenting commissioner found the majority's capitulation on the rate
base unwarranted because it compensated the corporate parent on capital
which represented ostensibly interest-free capital contributed by the sub-
scriber. He found specious an argument that the utility was entitled to
earn on such property because its corporate parent held other capital
available for loan to its subsidiary; as he saw it, such capital, while being
held available for the subsidiary, was meanwhile invested in interest bear-
ing government securities; as the dissenter put it, "The company's proposi-
tion that there are assets not represented by offsetting liabilities, seriously
considered, impugns the accuracy of its own books and reports." 22
As I have noted, increasing the rate base to which the rate of return was
to be applied had the effect of raising the proposed return for the common
stock as arrived at from market studies. The majority, however, raised the
composite rate still further by decreasing the recommended debt ratio from
40% to 35%. Since this step also decreased the amount of "avoidable" taxes,
the over-all effect was two-fold: (1) to increase the dollars of net operating
revenue deemed necessary; (2) to decrease the amount of net operating
revenue actually or potentially available from current rates (potentially to
the extent of tax and interest savings from substituting bonds for debt).
The dissenter (and the intervening state attorney general) noted that,
applying the determined rate of return to capital obligations rather than
to property, no additional revenues were required even on the basis of the
utility's actual debt ratio. The dissenter urged the use of a 40% debt ratio
as in previous commission cases, dismissing as thoroughly unrealistic the
utility position that "risks involved in the telephone business are greater
than risks in other regulated utility industries such as electric, and are on a
par with risks in manufacturing."'2
121. Id. at 403. Dollars of net operating revenue not representing interest cost
translate into more than two dollars of gross operating revenue to permit payment of
corporate taxes at 52%.
122. Id. at 406-08.




We have examined the problem of public utility debt ratio from the
point of view of four different commissions. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, directly concerned as it has been with investors' interests
perhaps more than with consumers' interests, was a driving force in seeking
to bring down the high ratios of debt and senior securities and in increasing
the accompanying slender coverage for fixed charges which had been the
hallmark of public utility holding company systems in their heyday. We
have seen that Commission's original objectives tempered as operating
company plant accounts were cleared of write-ups and holding company
control was either eliminated or economically and technically rationalized.
We have seen the impact on that Commission's thinking of favorable power
rates negotiated for government projects through power plants built with
a large percentage of low cost debt. The prophecies of a spokesman for
the electric industry that there would be a stabilization of debt and pre-
ferred stock ratios at from 60% to 701 have to a large degree been realized
during the past decade.m
In the rate regulation work of the Federal Power Commission, especially
in regard to the natural gas industry but also involving some electric enter-
prises, we have seen the Commission stand firmly for a cost of capital
method of determining rates, with full recognition of the savings to con-
sumers implicit in a substantial percentage of debt in the utility capital
structure. Primarily it has had to check an industry impluse to over
capitalize itself with senior securities; its task to a substantial degree has
been to make sure that the savings in taxes and capital costs from a
capitalization containing substantial debt were shared with the consumer
through reasonable limitations on the return inuring to the common stock.
This it has done through the utilization of market earnings-price data in
fixing the appropriate return on common stock. There has been rare need
and no inclination on the part of this Commission to assume debt ratios
larger than actual for the protection of consumer interests.
The Federal Communications Commission, on the other hand, has had
to deal with a segment of public utilities whose largest company has
124. A tabulation prepared by the Louisiana Public Service Commission staff, repro-
duced at 26 P.U.R.3d 85 (1958), indicated the following as of December 31, 1956:
Preferred
Long-term Debt Stock
Privately-owned Electric Utilities 50.5% 12,2%
Natural Gas Utilities 59.9 8.5
Moody's 24 Electric Utilities 50.1 12.2
Dow-Jones 15 Utilities 51.3 9.8
10 Leading Electric Utilities in U.S. 51.0 12,2
3 Largest Electric Utilities in U.S. 51.0 12.8
3 Leading Southern Electric Utilities 53.0 9.0
5 Louisiana Electric Utilities 51.8 14.5
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bitterly resisted all attempts to orientate its financing towards the general
public utility approach to the use of debt; the latter's approach has been so
conservative as to render its bonds at a minimum Aa, with earnings cover-
age such as to give it survival assurance in an economic gale of almost
maximum intensity. While this Commission has made some of the basic
financial market studies and recommendations with respect to optimum
debt ratios (now widely used by state regulatory bodies),125 it has itself
had rare occasion to put into effect the results of its studies in published
opinions. This has stemmed from the fact that only a limited portion of the
communications network of the Bell system is deemed interstate and hence
subject to direct rate regulation by the Commission. 26 Inquiries into the
rate structure of these operations have usually terminated with voluntary
rate reductions by the American Company without progressing through
opinion and order fixing a general rate of return based on cost of capital
studies. On the record at least, the Commission has rarely had to make
assumptions in Bell cases as to appropriate debt ratios and as to whether
common stockholders or subscribers shall absorb the costs in high equity
costs and taxes of low debt ratios. Thus the conclusion of the Commission's
elaborate studies in the late 1930's resulted only in a cryptic statement in
the 1940 annual report that the "American... Company reduced rates on
long distance telephone calls ...resulting in an estimated annual saving
to the public of $5,300,000. This reduction was affected as a result of
conferences .. .without the necessity of legal proceedings." Again in
1959, the fi-uits of "continuing studies of interstate operating results" which
"indicated need for rate reductions" were reported in the 1959 annual report
to the effect that "discussions resulted in an agreement by the Bell system
to file revised tariffs with the Commission reducing rates for interstate long-
distance telephone calls by about $50 million annually."' 28 That a full
opinion and order on the long distance operations of the American com-
pany would be useful and interesting on the issue of debt ratios is indicated
by the views on that subject which the Commission has expressed in rate
determinations involving other communications carriers. Thus, in 1959,
when the American company voluntarily reduced rates $50,000,000 on some
operations, the Commission made a formal rate determination for certain
other international communications carriers, in the course of which it
announced:129
[Ilt appears to us that in fixing a rate of return we must keep in mind the
capital structure which a regulated carrier chooses to maintain as against that
125. Cases are collected in Rose, Cost of Capital in Rate Regulation, 43 VA. L. Rv.
1079, 1084 (1957).
126. See FCC, STATISIcs OF CcaLmvNxcAnONS CommoN C mum s table 15 (1958).
127. FCC, ANN. REPn. 30 (1940).
128. FCC, ANN. REPn. 108 (1959).
129. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 F.C.C. 535, 600-01 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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which it could prudently maintain in order to balance properly the requirements
of safety of investment, stability of dividends, and availability of capital, and an
obligation to maintain that rate structure which will, consistent with the foregoing,
result in minimum requirements from the ratepaying public. Accordingly, we do
not believe it is proper to compare the return on equity of RCAC, which chooses
to maintain a 100 per cent equity status, with the return on equity of other public
utilities which raise substantial amounts of their capital requirements through debt
financing, especially since we have found that ROAC can support at least a 30
per cent debt structure at an embedded interest rate of not more than 4 per cent.
The effect of such a capital structure on return on equity as against the return on
a 100 per cent equity capital structure can be seen from the following. Assuming
a rate base of $15 million and net income before federal income taxes of $3
million the net income after computed taxes would be $1,440,000. This would
result in a return of 9.6 per cent on a 100 per cent equity capitalization. Assuming
a 30 per cent debt ratio at 4 per cent embedded interest the amount needed to
service the debt would be $180,000. After adjustment of computed tax, $1,353,600
would be left for a return on $10,500,000 of equity, or a return on equity of 12.9
per cent. The overall return would be 10.2 per cent. In fixing our overall return
herein for ROAC we shall, as we have stated above, fix a return in relationship to
that of other regulated public utilities with due account for differences on earnings
record, future prospects, relative stability, risk, and comparative capital structure.
The overall return allowed RCAC should, therefore, be considered in relation to
the over-all return allowed other utilities and not the earnings of such utilities
on their equity capital only.
It seems not unlikely that, had the interstate operations of the Bell system
been subjected to the same degree of regulatory study and deliberation in
adversary proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission as
have the intrastate components of the Bell system before state regulatory
commissions, a debt ratio of 45% or even 507 would have achieved such
respectability and acceptance that the Bell system could not have succeeded
in bringing its system debt ratio down from its post-war high of 50% to the
present 35%. Adversary proceedings at the interstate level were successfully
avoided, however, and no such relationship of leadership was developed by
the Federal Communications Commission in telephone regulation.
13
From the sampling of telephone regulation in Michigan during the past
decade and a half one sees the relatively uninhibited and variegated
resistance which a Bell system company can rally in countering regulatory
efforts to achieve the savings resulting from maintaining debt ratio above
the actual debt ratio of either the individual utility or the Bell system. It
also should be noted that the Michigan commission, as other state commis-
sions elsewhere, rarely succeeded in keeping the rate base as actual capital
obligations and the rate of return as a truly differentiated cost of capital
return so that the potential tax and interest from the higher debt ratio could
in fact be harvested for the subscriber.
130. Such a relationship was developed between the FCC and the state commissions




In seeking the rationale behind the resistance of the Bell companies, state
commissions no doubt may speculate as to whether the reason is really to
be found in the usual utility argument that the telephone industry, being
more risky than electric and gas utilities, must be better prepared to
weather hard times than those industries. A commission might ponder
whether it is really urging that it must keep its debt or creditors' claims so
low and property and earnings coverage so high as to practically eliminate
the threat of a bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding. If this be so, the
commission might properly ask whether the management of a utility is
entitled to hedge against the threat of depression and its hazards to what-
ever extent, in their judgment, will give the enterprise "reasonable prospect
of survival," even though the cost may be substantial to subscribers in higher
cost of equity capital and payment by the utility of "avoidable" taxes.131
On the other hand, a commission might question whether a regulatory
body should force savings in federal taxes on a utility when our total tax
bill must be paid in any event and when the result may actually be tax
shifting rather than tax saving.'32 How much distortion in proper tax
incidence results from paying substantially more federal taxes through
telephone bills than through other utility bills? Is the resulting distortion
too high a price to pay for the financial security which management finds
necessary for the "bad times which will follow the good"?
Finally, would it be uncharitable for a state commission to speculate that
a 65 to 75% widely-held common equity interest, such as the Bell system
finds necessary, may also render management practically impregnable to
"control raids" by outside groups at any time, in addition to furnishing
131. "There are undoubtedly many situations in which the consuming public would
be better off if return were to be reduced to an otherwise reasonable amount, regard-
less of the fact that such a re-adjustment might necessitate a corresponding reorganiza-
tion of the capital structure of the utility.. . . Although the regulatory authority may
decide that, for companies of these characteristics, protecting the company's credit
will result in more ultimate harm than good to the consuming public, it should be
realized that this requires a definite decision that the corporation's ability to secure
additional common stock capital, and in some cases, capital of any sort, is not as
important as lower rates to the consuming public." FCC, op. cit. supra note 59, at 31.
132. "The fundamental assumption of the advocates of heavy debt financing is that
avoidance of federal taxes is a basic obligation that utilities and regulatory bodies have
to the ratepayer and that the protection of stockholders' interest should be subordinated
to this obligation. * * * Thus the will of Congress could be subverted and corporate
taxes avoided. This seems to follow logically from the tax avoidance doctrine. * * *
Tax avoidance is an individualistic concept hardly suitable as a guide to public policy.
When practiced on a large scale, it becomes tax shifting, which would merely change
the type of tax levy, not the total collected, and is therefore deceptive as a real boon
to the public. * * * If practiced by utilities at the behest of commissions, it would
constitute a refusal to act as tax collectors for the federal government. Such irrespof-
sible policies are not in the public interest. They would probably also result in further
deficits, a general refusal of the public to pay higher taxes, and further inflation."
Morton, Structure of the Capital Market and the Price of Money, 44 Am. ECON. Rlv.
451-52 (1954).
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insurance against loss of control in bankruptcy or reorganization; a state
commission might well ponder whether subscribers should be asked to
subsidize such a result, seemingly beyond management's legitimate concern
with protecting the enterprise itself against financial disaster. It might
wonder whether issues such as these can ever be adequately ventilated in
the "piece meal" consideration of state commission regulation or whether
they must await the broad-gauged analysis seemingly only possible under
pervasive federal regulation.
